Europe Warns It Cannot Sustain a Long-Term Hybrid War With Russia, Calls for Rapid Response

On 4 September 2026, defence officials gathered at the Munich Security Conference (MSC) to confront a growing threat: Russia’s escalating hybrid warfare against European states. The officials warned that Europe is ill‑prepared for a prolonged conflict and that NATO must focus on a swift resolution.

Hybrid warfare, a term coined by Frank Hoffman in 2007, blends conventional military force with irregular tactics such as cyber attacks, sabotage, political subversion and information operations. It is designed to destabilise a target while avoiding clear attribution. In the context of the Russo‑Ukrainian war, Russia has used hybrid methods to undermine European security without launching a full‑scale invasion.

According to a recent report by the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS), the number of Russian hybrid attacks in Europe quadrupled from 2023 to 2024. The surge has continued into 2025 and 2026, with the Kremlin reportedly increasing sabotage operations across the continent by a factor of four since 2024. These attacks range from covert infrastructure damage to cyber intrusions that target critical utilities and government networks.

Defence officials at the MSC said that the European public may not have the appetite for a long‑term war of attrition. "We cannot sustain a prolonged conflict with Russia," one senior NATO officer told the conference. "The focus must be on a rapid, decisive response that limits the duration of hostilities and protects our societies.” The officials argued that Russia’s hybrid strategy is aimed at weakening Europe before any conventional war begins.

The European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has struggled to coordinate a unified response. While the EU remains a key partner in NATO’s deterrence architecture, the EU’s decision‑making requires unanimity among its 27 member states, which slows the implementation of collective measures. The EU has imposed sanctions on Russia and frozen Russian assets, but the hybrid attacks continue.

The United States has taken a more proactive stance. In August 2026, Congress introduced legislation to increase funding for European cyber‑defence and to enhance intelligence sharing. A separate hearing held on 19 August 2026 examined the scope of Russian hybrid activities and the adequacy of U.S. support for European allies.

Experts note that hybrid warfare is not a new concept. Russia’s use of irregular tactics dates back to the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the conflict in eastern Ukraine. However, the scale and sophistication of the attacks have grown markedly in the past two years. The CRS report highlights that Russia’s hybrid operations now include kinetic sabotage—such as damaging rail lines and power grids—alongside cyber and political subversion.

The hybrid threat is also a political challenge. Russia’s strategy includes influencing public opinion and political processes in European democracies. The Kremlin’s support for extremist groups and its use of disinformation campaigns aim to erode trust in institutions.

The MSC discussion underscored the need for a coordinated European strategy. Defence officials called for increased investment in domestic defence capabilities, better intelligence cooperation, and a rapid response framework that can counter hybrid attacks before they cause widespread disruption.

In summary, Europe faces a persistent and intensifying hybrid threat from Russia. Defence officials at the Munich Security Conference have warned that the continent cannot endure a drawn‑out conflict and that NATO must prioritise a swift, decisive response. The U.S. Congress is preparing legislation to bolster European cyber‑defence and intelligence sharing, while the EU grapples with the challenges of collective decision‑making. The hybrid war, which blends sabotage, cyber attacks, and political subversion, remains a significant risk to European security and stability.